Cartesian dualism

One of the most serious problems faced by Cartesian dualism is that it makes the mind and the body so different that it becomes impossible to conceive how the one can have any effect on the other. This mind, not being in space, seems unable to get any leverage on physical things, so it becomes entirely mysterious how, when I make up my mind to do something in the material world, I can possibly bring it about.

2001, Stuart Brown, Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction with Readings, London; New York: Routledge, →ISBN, →LCCN, page 27

The other account, Cartesian dualism, denies that we ascribe the two sorts of properties to the same thing; rather we ascribe the physical sort to our body and the mental sort to ourselves, a non-physical ego. […] Strawson further argues that the very notion of a non-spatial particular, such as an ego is supposed to be, lacks intelligibility, for how can we understand how it is possible that there be two such which are otherwise the same when they cannot be distinguished spatially?

2001, P. F. Snowdon, edited by A. P. Martinich and David Sosa, A Companion to Analytic Philosophy (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy), Malden, Massechusetts; Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, →ISBN, →LCCN, page 343

Cartesian dualism makes intuitive sense; is seems so obvious that it just must be right. For example, I decide that I will move my hand in a precise manner—up, down, sideways—and then, whenever I am ready, I do it. Obviously, a thought in my mind commands the movement in my hand.

2012, Ronald Chase, The Physical Basis of Mental Illness, New Brunswick; London: Transaction Publishers, →ISBN, →LCCN, page 34

The bad news is that Cartesian dualism makes the interface between minds and bodies — mind—body interaction — wholly mysterious. How could substances sharing no attributes causally interact?

2013, John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd edition, New York; London: Routledge, →ISBN, →LCCN, pages 12-13

The Cartesian dualism is the crowning achievement of individual objectivity. It states the fundamental principles of the classical scientific method: that the scientist or observer is not included in the system he is observing; that his system of knowledge is related to the thinking individual ‘I’ has a position in space, yet is himself paradoxically separate from it.

1982, David Castillejo, The Formation of Modern Objectivity, Madrid: Ediciones de Arte y Bibliofilla, →ISBN, page 217

This conservative principle is associated with one of the most influential ideas in Western thought: Cartesian dualism, the doctrine I have labelled as diamond minds. Dualism is the philosopher René Descartes’ notion that selves are ‘thinking things’, mysterious entities on the (posh) incorporeal side of a strict division between high mind and lower matter. If minds are as different from bodies as Descartes suggested, we wouldn’t expect changes in bodies to have any effects on minds.

2004, Kathleen Taylor, Brainwashing: The Science of Thought Control, Oxford: Oxford University Press, →ISBN, page 116