hyperphenomenal

comparative more hyperphenomenal · superlative most hyperphenomenal

1. rareAbove and beyond what is phenomenal; superphenomenal.

   But it is equally true that law has essentially a hyperphenomenal significance, inasmuch as it tends to institute an ethical order and attributes values, independent of physical actualization — without which it would not be law.

   1914, Nikolaĭ Mikhaĭlovich Korkunov, William Granger Hastings, General Theory of Law, Boston Book Company, pages 319-320

   5 more examples

   In this sense we can say that all positive law—that is, all law exis ing in fact—is “natural”; by examining its determining factors and conditions we may come to understand its relative necessity and, as we say, explain it historically, but this does not imply any judgment concerning its intrinsic value as measured by the ideal standard of justice. This ideal is defined by the supreme law which corresponds to the spiritual essence of man, that is, to his hyperphenomenal nature. It is only in this latter sense that we can properly speak of natural law, as a paradigm and a rational criterion standing above positive law and enabling us to judge its value.

   1882, Adam and Charles Black, Edinburgh, Encyclopedia Britannica & Dictionary - Ninth Edition (25 Volumes), Boston Book Company, page 8

   He afterwards (§§ 3-24) goes on to argue that there can be nothing hyperphenomenal, or independent of a percipient mind, in the things of sense at least,—consistently with that faithful acceptance of experience, and rejection of empty words, on which he insists in the preceding Introduction.

   1891, George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser, Selections from Berkeley: With an Introduction and Notes for the Use of Students in the Universities, page 37

   Compared with Nature in her infinite vastness, her infinite minuteness, our sphere is indeed limited. It is the surface of this little world—or, indeed only a small part of that surface—with sky and its earthbom features, and beyond, the heavenly bodies, as the fine old phrase names them, with which we are concerned; yet the aspects of Nature to man as he sees and loves and strives to render them in poetry, from the beginning we shall find have constantly either expressed or implied the sense of Divine causation or presence; and with this, that mysterious sense that we also are in some way one with what we see; that silent voices are speaking to us from land and sky, even that whatever we find of real existence, of the hyperphenomenal (if I may use the word) in ourselves, is immanent throughout the Cosmos. Or (to quote from an eminently thoughtful writer) man's personifications of natural scenery, we may say, are" not the result of any mere ignorant "fancy by which we project ourselves into external Nature, but "evidently the result of an instinctive recognition of that" special kind of agency which is, indeed, familiarly known to "us as existing within ourselves, but which is also universally" recognised and identified as existing outside of us and around "us, on every side. It is a reflection of that infinite Reason," that Logos — of which we partake, and without which in "Nature was not anything made that was made. All things, "including ourselves, are full of it."

   1897, Francis Turner Palgrave, Landscape in Poetry from Homer to Tennyson, Macmillan and Company, Limited, page 5

   Mind you it is from phenomenal experiences that process is taken to this unphenomenal or hyper- phenomenal self-explaining and self-subsistent substance, supporting all things without needing any support itself. Now, how does this hyperphenomenal "substance," lodged in matter as a hard and qualityless core, help us to understand phenomenal reality? How can it ‘‘support’’ anything? And how can it be without supports? If the deity supports it, why should he support a support instead of directly supporting what needs his support?

   1901, John James Tigert, Theism: A Survey of the Paths That Lead to God, Chiefly in the Light of History of Philosophy, Publishing House of the M.E. Church, South, Barbee & Smith, page 319

   In this sense we can say that all positive law—that is, all law exis ing in fact—is “natural”; by examining its determining factors and conditions we may come to understand its relative necessity and, as we say, explain it historically, but this does not imply any judgment concerning its intrinsic value as measured by the ideal standard of justice. This ideal is defined by the supreme law which corresponds to the spiritual essence of man, that is, to his hyperphenomenal nature. It is only in this latter sense that we can properly speak of natural law, as a paradigm and a rational criterion standing above positive law and enabling us to judge its value.

   1969, Giorgio Del Vecchio, Man and Nature: Selected Essays, Boston Book Company, page 8