contractnik

plural contractniks · plural contractniki

1. alternativeAlternative form of kontraktnik.

   6 more examples

   Touching on the recent tragedy that occurred in the village of Prigorodnyy 7 July, when unknown persons wiped out an entire family of eight people, the Chechen head of government emphasized that this barbarous action was planned by someone and carried out for the purpose purpose of wrecking the talks. That cruel order might have been carried out either by Dzhokhar Dudayev’s supporters, who have long wallowed in violence and crime, or by so-called “contractniks” of the federal forces.

   1995 [1995 July 14], Vladimir Yanchenkov, translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Chechnya: When Will the Troubled Night End?”, in Daily Report: Central Eurasia, numbers 134–139, Washington, D.C.: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, →OCLC

   A new group of Russian professional soldiers, or contractniki, walks in the Russian military base of Khankala near the Chechen capital Grozny after arriving from Russia’s far east, nine time zones away. Local citizens accuse contractniki of most atrocities in the region where a bloody conflict with Moscow rages for 19 months and in which more than 30,000 people have been killed.

   1996 July 24, “New arrivals in Chechnya”, in Telegraph Journal, Saint John, N.B.: New Brunswick Publishing Company, →ISSN, →OCLC, page A8, column 2

   In spring 1995, the Russian Defence Ministry launched a wide-ranging campaign for signing short-term contracts (three to six months) with privates and sergeants for serving in Chechnya. But the lack of funds for this programme pushed the so-called ‘contractniks’ to earn their money through all sorts of extortions from the civilian population.

   1996 August 23, Pavel K[imovich] Baev, “Outlook: Through the Fog of War”, in The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo; London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, →ISBN, footnote 14, page 175

   Today soldiers in Chechnya “performing combat duties” are paid well according to Russian standards (800 Rub per day or approximately $28), so many enlist as “contractniki”, but the quality of these “professionals” is questionable. […] It’s reported that these “contractniki” are sent to Chechnya without any proper screening or training. Russian officers complain that such “contractniki” are highly unreliable in battle and badly disciplined.

   2000, Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russian Strategy in the Chechnya Wars”, in Walter Feichtinger, editor, Parameter bewaffneter Konflikte (Studien und Berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidi-gungsakademie; 4) (overall work in German and English), Vienna: Militärwissenschaftliches Büro, →ISBN, archived from the original on 16 Dec 2011, pages 8–9

   The effect of the continued and studied attrition of the Chechen people by Putin, his old chums in the KGB, now called the FSB, the leading organisation in the region, and the contractniki – the mercenaries – is simple, according to [Anna] Politkovskaya – so much hate is being created that there will be another war by 2015. […] I remember the fear hanging over Chechnya like a fog, the 14 Russian checkpoints we bamboozled our way through, the contractniki, armed to the teeth, lords of all creation.

   2001 July 22, John Sweeney, “Murder incorporated: From the ruins of Chechnya, a damning indictment of Vladimir Putin emerges”, in The Observer (Review section), London: Guardian News & Media, →ISSN, →OCLC, archived from the original on 09 May 2014, page 15, columns 2–3 and 5

   Contractniks but not Professionals / Based on our analysis above we can conclude that it is unlikely that the Federal Programme will result in the emergence of truly new, modern, and professional Armed Forces in Russia. But can the country achieve at least the creation of a few combat-ready units? In our view even this is more than doubtful, since the specific culture of conscript Armed Forced seems to prohibit the creation of even a small number of professional units.

   2004, Alexander Golts, “Military Reform in Russia: Conscription versus Professionalism”, in Kristina Spohr Readman, editor, Building Sustainable and Effective Military Capabilities: A Systemic Comparison of Professional and Conscript Forces (Science and Technology Policy; 45), Amsterdam: IOS Press, →ISBN, part IV (Reforming Postcommunist Militaries – The Difficulties of Changing Structures and Cultures), page 140